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AGGREGATING MORAL PREFERENCES
M ATTHEW D. A DLER∗

Abstract: Preference-aggregation problems arise in various contexts. One
such context, little explored by social choice theorists, is metaethical. ‘Idealadvisor’ accounts, which have played a major role in metaethics, propose
that moral facts are constituted by the idealized preferences of a community
of advisors. Such accounts give rise to a preference-aggregation problem:
namely, aggregating the advisors’ moral preferences. Do we have reason to
believe that the advisors, albeit idealized, can still diverge in their rankings
of a given set of alternatives? If so, what are the moral facts (in particular,
the comparative moral goodness of the alternatives) when the advisors do
diverge? These questions are investigated here using the tools of Arrovian
social choice theory.
Keywords: metaethics, ideal advisor, preference aggregation, social choice,
moral preferences

1. INTRODUCTION
A preference-aggregation problem arises when a ranking of alternatives
(for short, the ‘collective ranking’) is constrained to be sensitive to the
preferences of some community of individuals. Such a problem can be
formally modelled as follows. Each person in the community has her
own ranking of the alternatives, which takes the form of a binary relation
required to be well-behaved in some sense (e.g. transitive and reflexive).
The collective ranking is also required to be a well-behaved binary
relation, and its responsiveness to community preferences is captured via
an axiom such as weak or strong Pareto.1 Further axioms relating the
collective ranking to the individuals’ preferences may also be imposed.
∗
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The weak Pareto axiom requires that one alternative be ranked strictly better than a second
by the collective ranking if everyone in the community strictly prefers the first alternative
to the second; while the strong Pareto axiom requires this if everyone in the community
weakly prefers the first alternative to the second (on weak preference, see note 5), and at
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Social choice theory, in turn, is the body of knowledge that gives
us insights into preference aggregation as thus modelled – specifically
by telling us which combinations of axioms regarding the individual
and collective rankings cannot be jointly satisfied (as in Arrow’s famous
impossibility theorem), and reciprocally by describing the methodologies
for arriving at a collective ranking that are consistent with, or entailed by,
one or another compossible group of axioms (Sen 1986; Arrow et al. 2002,
2010).
Social choice theory, understood as a rich library of such impossibility
and possibility results, is a powerful tool for thinking about preferenceaggregation problems. But social choice theory is not itself the source
of these problems. They come from normative ethics, political or social
theory or practices, or metaethics. That is to say, the identification of
the relevant alternatives, and of the relevant community of preference
holders; the argument that the collective ranking should satisfy the
weak or strong Pareto principle with respect to that community; and
the specification of additional conditions as appropriate, proceeds from
some substantive view regarding the good or the right (normative ethics);
an understanding about how political communities or social institutions
generally do or should govern themselves (political or social theory or
practices); or a higher-order thesis about the kinds of facts, and kinds of
knowledge, that ground first-order normative claims (metaethics).
Two kinds of preference-aggregation problems have been intensively
studied: interest aggregation2 and voting rules.
(1) Interest aggregation. This problem is the focus of scholarship on socalled ‘social welfare functions’ (Adler 2012 and sources cited therein).
The social-welfare-function scholarship can be understood (I suggest) as
resting on two fundamental normative premises, one concerning moral
goodness, the second concerning well-being. The first is what Broome
(1991) terms the Principle of Personal Good, namely: If everyone in the
community of welfare subjects (those whose well-being has moral weight)
is at least as well off with alternative x as compared with alternative y,3
and some are strictly better off, then x is morally better than y. The second,
call it Preferentism about Well-Being, says that someone is at least as well
off with an alternative x as compared with y iff4 she weakly prefers5 or

2
3
4
5

least one of them strictly prefers the first alternative. See section 3 for a formal statement
of the weak Pareto axiom.
This terminology is used by Sen. See e.g. Sen (1977, 1986: 1129).
It is a further question for interest aggregation what sort of item the ‘alternatives’ are – in
particular, whether they are outcomes or actions (Adler 2012: ch. 7).
‘Iff’ means ‘if and only if’.
‘Weak preference’ is a disjunction of attitudes: An individual ‘weakly prefers’ one
alternative to a second if she either strictly prefers (affirmatively favours) the first, or is
indifferent.
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would prefer x to y and this preference is appropriately laundered.6 Note
how the combination of the Principle of Personal Good and Preferentism
about Well-Being yields a preference-aggregation problem: the moral
ranking of alternatives must satisfy the strong Pareto principle with
respect to the laundered preferences of the community of welfare subjects.
(2) Voting rules. The problem of voting rule arises whenever some
societal institution is designed so that the choice over some set of
alternatives is delegated to a community of voters, each with some
ranking of those alternatives. (For surveys of the social choice literature
on voting rules, see Brams and Fishburn 2002; Pattanaik 2002.) While
the interest-aggregation problem arises within the context of a specific,
welfarist, moral view – a view that embraces the Principle of Personal
Good – the basis for the voting-rule problem is much more heterogeneous.
Virtually every moral theory endorses or at least allows for institutions
wherein certain decisions are made by voting among a multimember
group. Moreover, theorists might well take the existence of such
institutions as ‘given’ as a matter of societal practices – for example, as a
bedrock legal feature of democratic polities – without worrying about yet
deeper, moral, foundations. The design of voting rules becomes a problem
of preference aggregation once we require that alternatives universally
favoured by the voters be collectively preferred. Note that Preferentism
about Well-Being is no necessary ingredient of this preference-aggregation
problem. Plausibly, we might think that a well-designed voting rule
should satisfy weak or strong Pareto in terms of voters’ preferences
regardless of whether voters are motivated by their own well-being, moral
considerations or other factors.
This article describes a third, less familiar kind of preferenceaggregation problem: the problem of metaethical aggregation. The context
for this problem is quite different from that of interest aggregation, and
different again from that of voting rules. So, too, are the preferences being
aggregated. Still, the problem of metaethical aggregation – like these two
others – is ripe for exploration using the apparatus of social choice theory.
Or so I wish to suggest in this article.
The problem of metaethical aggregation arises from a particular
view regarding the nature of normative or value facts. ‘Ideal advisor’
6

Laundering is required because it is implausible that satisfying someone’s actual
preferences suffices to benefit her. A plausible version of Preferentism about Well-Being
says: someone is at least as well off with x as y iff she would weakly prefer the first
alternative under conditions of rationality, good information and self-interest (Adler 2012:
ch. 3). The moral preferences relevant to the ideal-advisor account (see below, section 3)
also need to be laundered (‘idealized’), but in a different way. Moral preferences must
meet an impartiality screen, while (I suggest) someone’s preferences ground her wellbeing only if they are self-interested. However, the details of the laundering component
of Preferentism about Well-Being are not relevant here.
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(IA) accounts of normative or value facts analyse them in terms of the
preferences of a community of advisors (with ‘community’ used here to
include single-membered groups). Such accounts have a prominent place
in the literature on metaethics. For example, Roderick Firth (1952) offers
a seminal IA account of moral facts. Peter Railton (1995, 2003) provides
two, distinct, IA analyses: one for non-moral good, and one for facts
about moral goodness. Michael Smith (1994, 1997, 2004, 2005) offers a
very general account: on his view, facts about normative reasons are facts
about the preferences of a community of advisors. Richard Brandt (1979)
analyses facts about rationality in terms of advisors’ preferences. Both
Smith and Brandt then handle moral facts as one application of their more
general analyses.
IA accounts give rise to a preference-aggregation problem. Why? The
thrust of such an account is that normative or value facts are constituted by
the preferences of some community. Thus, if everyone in the community
has the relevant sort of preference for x over y, it must be the case that x
possesses the normative/value property while y does not (or possesses the
normative/value property to a greater degree than y). In short, it seems
very plausible that those who tender such accounts would endorse the
weak Pareto principle, specified in terms of the relevant preferences.
To be sure, if the community of advisors is a singleton, the preferenceaggregation problem just described will be trivial: the normative or value
facts will reduce to the preferences of the one person who comprises
the community. With a non-singleton community, however, the problem
becomes more interesting.
Specifically, the focus of this article will be on IA accounts of
moral facts. What is the rule that relates the moral preferences of some
community of advisors to the moral facts? I will refer to this problem as
that of ‘moral aggregation’ or ‘aggregating moral preferences’. Although
the focus is moral facts (in particular, facts regarding comparative moral
goodness), many aspects of the analysis generalize to other types of
normative or value facts.
Section 2 is a very brief survey of IA accounts. The bulk of the
article then uses a specific cluster of concepts and axioms to analyse the
problem of moral aggregation – a cluster that I call the ‘quasi-Arrovian
setup’. The quasi-Arrovian setup, presented in section 3, has the following
features. Each advisor’s moral preferences take the form of a quasiordering
of the set of alternatives: an ordinal ranking which is transitive and
reflexive if not necessarily complete. There is then a moral aggregation
function M which associates any given profile of ordinal rankings for
each advisor, with a moral goodness ranking M of the alternatives. This
moral goodness ranking M is itself a quasiordering. And M satisfies
axioms of weak Pareto, intermediate Pareto, Anonymity, Independence,
and Across-Situation Ranking Consistency (ASRC) – which constrain the
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moral goodness ranking to conform in some way with the given profile,
or to covary in some way with the moral goodness rankings arising from
other possible profiles.
Having presented the quasi-Arrovian setup, I proceed to consider
the implications for the moral-aggregation problem of different ‘domain’
axioms: axioms that specify what are the possible profiles of moral
preferences that the community of advisors might have. One such
axiom (call it ‘Ordering Convergence’) stipulates that all advisors, once
appropriately idealized, necessarily have the very same ranking of the
set of alternatives. Some IA theorists have made statements about the
convergence of moral preferences which might be read as endorsing
Ordering Convergence. With this premise in place, the problem of
aggregating moral preferences is readily solved. But should we indeed
accept Ordering Convergence? This question is addressed in Section 4.
Section 5 continues to work within the quasi-Arrovian setup, but
now relaxes Ordering Convergence. It considers the implication for
moral aggregation of permitting profiles in which advisors have nonidentical rankings of the set of alternatives. At the other extreme from
Ordering Convergence is ‘Universal Domain’: any logically possible
profile is included within , the set of such profiles upon which the
moral aggregation function M is supposed to operate. The supposition
of Universal Domain together with weak Pareto, intermediate Pareto,
Anonymity and Independence dramatically narrows the possibilities for
moral aggregation. There is only one moral aggregation function M that
satisfies this combination of axioms7 – a function I will refer to as the
‘Unanimity Rule’.
Section 5 also briefly considers domain assumptions intermediate
between the two extremes of Ordering Convergence and Universal
Domain. In this intermediate territory, a wider range of functional forms
for M are consistent with the axioms just mentioned – for example,
majority vote. However, adding ASRC plus an additional mild axiom
forces us back to the Unanimity Rule.
Section 6 addresses the possibility of moving beyond the quasiArrovian set-up: by relaxing Independence or, more radically, both
Independence and ASRC. As we shall see, ASRC requires that the
moral goodness ranking of a set of alternatives be wholly determined
by advisors’ ordinal preferences. Independence goes further and says
that the comparative moral goodness of two alternatives depends upon
the advisors’ pairwise ordinal preferences with respect to the two. Why
embrace these axioms? What would moral aggregation look like if they
were dropped? Section 6 undertakes a preliminary discussion of these
topics.
7

This assumes that the cardinality of the set of alternatives being ranked is greater than two.
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The problem of metaethical aggregation is much too large to be
comprehensively addressed in a single article. The ambition, here, is
simply to bring the problem into clearer focus. Curiously, the problem
has not been discussed in a sustained way by metaethicists. Within
social choice theory, a small body of scholars – writing about so-called
‘extensive social choice’ – have addressed the topic of aggregating moral
preferences. (Ooghe and Lauwers 2005 and sources cited therein). More
of this work needs to be done. Metaethical aggregation is a problem that
can be illuminated using the tools that Arrow and his successors have
given us.
2. WHY IDEAL-ADVISOR ACCOUNTS?
I will use the term ‘cognitivism’ as a shorthand for the family of
metaethical views that combine a propositional semantics for normative
statements, with a non-error-theoretic view of normative facts (Smith
2005; Schroeder 2010; Miller 2013). According to ‘cognitivists’, (1) a
normative statement has the (sole) semantic content of asserting that
some normative fact obtains – that some object, e.g. an action, outcome
or person, has a normative property; and (2) indeed some facts of this
sort do obtain, so that normative statements can be true. Cognitivism is
to be contrasted with views according to which normative statements
have partly or wholly8 non-assertoric content (expressing the speaker’s
emotions, commitments or plans); and with sceptical views that see
normative statements as asserting the existence of facts that never obtain,
so that normative statements are always false.
Ideal-advisor (‘IA’) views are a subfamily within cognitivist accounts.
IA views analyse normative facts in terms of the preferences of some
(single- or multimembered) community of advisors, preferences that are
idealised in some way by imposing conditions of good information,
rationality, etc. on the advisors. By ‘normative facts’, I mean facts
that involve normative or value properties, such as moral goodness or
rightness, well-being, being a reason for, etc.
Such views have figured prominently in contemporary metaethics.
Here are perhaps the most famous examples.
(1) Firth. Firth proposes that the statement ‘x is morally right’ be
understood to mean ‘any ideal observer would approve x’, where an
ideal observer is an otherwise normal person who is omniscient with
respect to non-moral facts; has unlimited powers of imagination; and is
disinterested, dispassionate and consistent (Firth 1952).
8

Traditional expressivists see normative statements as wholly non-assertoric, while hybrid
expressivists may see them as partly non-assertoric: both asserting a fact, and expressing an
emotion, commitment, plan, etc. (Ridge 2006, 2014; Schroeder 2009).

Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Duke University Libraries, on 22 May 2017 at 18:02:35, subject to the Cambridge Core
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267115000486

AGGREGATING MORAL PREFERENCES

289

(2) Railton. Railton in a series of writings has advanced two distinct IA
views, one for well-being, the second for moral good. (a) A given person’s
well-being (‘non-moral good’) is determined by what she (if idealized)
would want herself to do or want in her actual, non-ideal circumstances.
Give to an actual individual A unqualified cognitive and imaginative
powers, and full factual and nomological information about his physical
and psychological constitution, capacities, circumstances, history, and so
on. A will have become A+, who has complete and vivid knowledge of
himself and his environment, and whose instrumental rationality is in no
way defective. We now ask A+ to tell us not what he currently wants, but
what he would want his nonidealized self A to want – or, more generally, to
seek – were he to find himself in the actual condition and circumstances of
A. (Railton 2003: 11)

(b) Railton suggests that ‘X is morally wrong’ be understood to mean:
‘We the people (i.e., people in general, including the speaker) would
disapprove of allowing X as part of our basic scheme of social cooperation
were we to consider the question with full information from a standpoint
that considers the well-being of all affected without partiality.’ (Railton 1995:
69)

(3) Smith. Smith offers a general account of ‘normative reasons’ in
terms of the preferences of fully rational agents.
I have been arguing that the truth of a normative reason claim requires a
convergence in the desires of fully rational agents. However note that the
convergence required is not at the level of desires about how each such agent
is to organize her own life in her own world. . . . The convergence required
is rather at the level of their hypothetical desires about what is to be done
in the various circumstances in which they might find themselves. (Smith
1994: 173; see also Smith 1997, 2004: ch. 10, 2005)

Moral reasons, for Smith, are in turn normative reasons with the
additional special features (whatever exactly they may be) that are picked
out by our platitudes about the domain of the moral (for example, that
moral considerations involve important interests of persons other than the
actor – thus that I have moral and normative reason to refrain from killing,
but a non-moral normative reason to relax after a hard day at work) (Smith
1994: 183–4).
(4) Brandt. Brandt, like Smith, offers a very general IA account. For
Smith, the analysandum is the property of being a ‘normative reason’;
for Brandt, it is the property of being ‘rational’. Some individual’s action
is ‘rational’, according to Brandt, if the action is optimal in light of her
underlying desires and those desires themselves are ‘rational’ in the sense
of surviving ‘cognitive psychotherapy’: a ‘process of confronting desires
with relevant information, by repeatedly representing [that information],
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in an ideally vivid way’ (Brandt 1979: 113). Brandt then uses his
conception of ‘rational’, together with the concept of a ‘moral code’
(roughly, norms regulating feelings of guilt), to define ‘morally wrong’.
He sets forth two possibilities, here:
I suggest ... that we assign ‘is morally wrong’ the descriptive meaning
‘would be prohibited by any moral code which all fully rational persons
would tend to support, in preference to all others or to none at all, for the
society of the agent, if they expected to spend a life-time in that society . . . ’
This suggested descriptive meaning is only one possibility. There are others,
and perhaps better ones. For instance, if it turned out that not all fully
rational persons would tend to support the same moral code in preference
to all others, it would be better if ‘morally wrong’ were given a slightly
different descriptive meaning, perhaps ‘would be permitted by any moral
code which I [or you], if I [you] were fully rational, would tend to support,
in preference to all others or to none at all . . . ’ (Brandt 1979: 194; cf. Brandt
1955)

Metaethics is a field of controversy, with every account hotly
disputed; but IA accounts, clearly, are prima facie appealing and have
been embraced by some very sophisticated metaethicists. Why? Like all
cognitivist accounts – and by contrast with views that see normative
statements as doing something other than asserting facts – IA approaches
are not troubled by the ‘Frege-Geach’ problem (Schroeder 2010; Miller
2013). Like other non-error-theoretic approaches, they do not see ordinary
normative discourse as radically misguided – as making statements that
are never true. By contrast with non-naturalist cognitivism – positing the
existence of normative facts that are qualitatively distinct from the facts
that figure within physical, psychological and social science – IA views
are ‘naturalist’ in reducing normativity to a certain kind of psychological
fact, namely facts about what an observer or observers in a certain
informational and emotional state would desire.
Finally, facts about ideal advisors conform to two truisms about
normative facts (or at least are well suited to conform to these truisms,
given an appropriate specification of the community of advisors and the
idealizing conditions). On the one hand, individuals are not infallible
about normative facts (if such exist). On the other hand, normative facts,
somehow, are tied to motivation: If I genuinely judge that x is morally
good (for example), then I am motivated to pursue x. It is initially difficult
to see how any fact could have both these features, but indeed facts about
the preferences of ideal advisors could. Since a given person’s preferences
need not be ideal, she is not infallible about what ideal advisors would
want. However, the belief that someone with preferences like my own,
thinking calmly and with good information, would want me to x, will tend
to motivate me towards x, notwithstanding that I lack good information,
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and even if my current deliberational state is less than fully ideal –
just as my belief that someone with excellent information and cognitive
capacities would believe p will tend to cause me (imperfectly informed as
I may be) to believe p.
IA accounts (to be plausible) should not be understood as giving
the meaning of the concept or term ‘moral’ or other normative or value
concepts or terms. The statement ‘x is morally good’ does not have the
same semantic content as ‘x would be approved by a community of ideal
advisors’. Rather (to be plausible) such accounts should be understood
as identifying the natural properties or property clusters referred to by
such terms. For naturalist cognitivists, discovering such properties is
quasi-scientific – a matter both of understanding what we mean by our
normative concepts, the ‘truisms’ or ‘platitudes’ constitutive of them,
and of establishing which physical, psychological or social properties are
suitable to be the naturalistic basis for the normative concepts (given how
such properties function in light of physical, psychological or social laws).
Such discovery is at least roughly analogous to the discovery that the
physical substance referred to by the term ‘water’ is the molecule H2 O –
a discovery that combines conceptual analysis (the truism that ‘water’, as
understood by anyone who grasps the concept, is a liquid, if fresh will
quench thirst, is found in lakes, rivers and oceans, etc.) and empirical
investigation (Jackson 1998).9
Let me now suggest a differentiation between two types of IA
accounts: ‘singleton’ accounts, where the community of advisors whose
preferences give rise to normative/value facts is guaranteed to have a
single member; and ‘multimember’ accounts, where this is not the case
(i.e. the community can have multiple members).
A cross-cutting distinction is between relativist and non-relativist
(absolutist) IA accounts (Firth 1952; Smith 1994, 2004: ch. 10). Relativists
with respect to some type of normative/value property posit that
statements regarding the property can hold true relative to one speaker
or group, but false relative to another. This is a familiar idea from the
literature on moral relativism (Harman and Thomson 1996). Extrapolating
from this literature, one can imagine a type of IA account whereby
the truth of the assertion of a particular normative/value fact is
relativized to one or another community of advisors. By contrast, an
absolutist IA account posits a single community of advisors: A particular
normative/value fact either obtains or not, in virtue of the preferences of
this single community, and an assertion of this normative/value fact is
either true absolutely or not.
9

Although I find it most plausible that the nexus between moral goodness and advisors’
approvals is a posteriori, the IA theorist might disagree – claiming that the connection is a
priori. This issue is orthogonal to the analysis that follows.
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Note now that both absolutist and relativist IA views can assume
either the singleton or multimember form. An absolutist IA account
might analyse a particular kind of normative/value fact in terms of
all persons’ idealized preferences (multimember); in terms of God’s
preferences (singleton); or, perhaps, in terms of the preferences of a
particular person (singleton), if the fact concerns the actions or well-being
of that particular person. For example, the fact that a particular action of
Jane’s would be morally wrong could be reduced to Jane’s preferences.
A relativist IA view might posit that assertions of normative/value
fact are true relative to communities which can have multiple members
(this counts as a multimember IA account on the definition offered
above). For example, moral facts might be relativized to one or another
community consisting of individuals in the same society. Alternatively,
a relativist view could stipulate that the communities relative to which
normative/value statements are true must be singleton.
That IA accounts can assume either the singleton or multimember
form is evident even from my brief descriptions of Railton’s, Brandt’s,
Smith’s and Firth’s views. Railton offers a singleton account of wellbeing, but not of moral rightness. Whether x is good for Sue’s wellbeing depends upon what Sue (if idealized) would want; whether x is
morally right depends upon what some plural ‘we’ would want.10 Brandt,
quite visibly, oscillates between a singleton and multimember account
of moral rightness. Brandt’s singleton proposal is: x is morally right
relative to a given individual iff she would rationally want a moral code
that approves x. Brandt’s multimember proposal is: x is absolutely (nonrelatively) morally right iff all of us would rationally want a moral code
that approves x.
Smith offers a thunderous argument for an absolutist and multimember conception of normative reasons. Facts about normative
reasons are made true by the convergent, fully rational desires of all
persons.
On the non-relative conception of normative reasons . . . it is desirable that
p in C just in case we would all desire that p in C if we were fully rational.
...
On the relative conception, . . . matters are quite different . . . . ‘It is desirable
that p in C’ as assessed from A’s perspective is true if and only if A would
desire that p in C if A were fully rational, ‘It is desirable that p in C’ as
assessed from B’s perspective is true if and only if B would desire that p in
C if B were fully rational, and so on and so forth . . .
10

Railton suggests that this view is closer to absolutism than relativism. ‘[A]lthough it is a
first-person view . . . it is a first-person plural, reaching out to ‘people in general’ rather
than any specific group of persons’ (Railton 1995: 70–71).
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[I]f normative reasons were indeed relative, then mere reflection on that
fact would suffice to undermine their normative significance. For on the
relative conception it turns out that, for example, the desirabilityme of some
consideration, p, is entirely dependent on the fact that my actual desires are
such that, if I were to engage in a process of systematically justifying my
desires, weeding out those that aren’t justified and acquiring those that are,
a desire that p would be one of the desires that I would end up having.
But what my actual desires are to begin with is, on this relative conception
of reasons, an entirely arbitrary matter . . . . I might have had any old set of
desires to begin with, even a set that delivered up the desire that not p after
a process of systematic justification. (Smith 1994: 166–7, 172)

In short: ‘Acts are right or wrong depending on whether, notwithstanding
any contingent and rationally optional culturally induced differences in
our actual desires, we would all desire or be averse to the performance of
such acts if we had a set of desires that was maximally informed, coherent,
and unified’ (Smith 2004: 205). Firth’s view is also explicitly ‘absolutist’
(Firth 1952: 320) and multimember: it construes ethical statements as
‘assertions about the dispositions of all [hypothetical] beings of a certain
kind’, namely all ideal observers (1952: 320).
It is well beyond the scope of this article to address the pros and
cons of singleton versus multimember IA accounts with respect to moral
goodness or rightness, well-being, or other normative/value properties.
Rather, the remainder of the article will train its attention on the non-trivial
problem of preference aggregation that a multimember IA account faces.
The account either needs to show that the community or communities
of advisors will be such that members will have identical preferences; or,
alternatively, to explain what the normative facts will be when community
members have non-identical preferences.
Let us now analyse this problem in detail – focusing specifically,
as promised, on moral properties. How do moral facts arise from a
multimember community of advisors?
3. AGGREGATING MORAL PREFERENCES: A QUASI-ARROVIAN
FRAMEWORK
What follows is one cluster of concepts and axioms that might be used
to model the problem of aggregating moral preferences. This set-up is
similar, in formal structure, to that introduced by Arrow (1951, 1963) in
Social Choice and Individual Values – but not identical, and so I call it ‘quasiArrovian’.11
11

An important difference is that Arrow requires both the individual inputs and the
collective output to be complete rankings. By contrast, I allow for incompleteness: both
inputs and output are quasiorderings, possibly incomplete. Note that the Unanimity Rule
(section 5 below) is not guaranteed to yield a complete moral goodness ranking – indeed
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(1) We are given some set of items S = {x, y, z . . . }. The members of
any such set (of an appropriate kind) have moral goodness or rightness
properties. I focus on moral betterness (comparative goodness), and leave
aside absolute goodness and moral rightness.12
S, then, is any set of things each pair of which are appropriate for
assessment as comparatively morally better or worse13 – for example,
different token actions that a particular agent might undertake at a
particular moment in time, or different possible worlds, or different
institutions or practices that might exist in a society. The totality of facts
about the comparative goodness of the items in S can be summarized (I
assume) by a moral quasiordering M-S of S. I will call S a ‘situation’, and
will refer to the items in S as ‘alternatives’.
Let #S denote the cardinality of S. Unless otherwise stipulated, #S can
take any value: S can have any finite number of elements, or be countably
or uncountably infinite. One part of the analysis below does assume that
#S > 2, and that will be stated explicitly.
(2) I assume a finite multimember set N of advisors. N = {1, . . . k, . . .
N}, with k used below to denote a particular advisor, and N > 1. Which
persons and, thus, advisors will exist is, of course, not independent of
what we now do – which in turn may depend upon the goodness of
actions and outcomes, the very thing that the community of advisors’
views is meant to be determining – but to simplify I ignore the possibility
of a ‘variable population’ of advisors. Moreover, I assume that each
advisor is an actual person, who exists in the actual world. The actual
facts of comparative moral goodness concerning a given situation are,
plausibly, fixed by the preferences of actual, not counterfactual advisors.
Below, we will consider the kind of counterfactual moral goodness
that arises from the non-actual preferences of the actual advisors; but
the doubly counterfactual moral goodness arising from the non-actual
preferences of non-actual advisors is beyond the scope of the model.

12

13

will produce noncomparability between two alternatives if even one advisor strictly
prefers one and another strictly prefers the other. This is why my characterization of this
rule is consistent with Arrow’s impossibility result.
A second difference is that my setup adds an across-situation consistency requirement
(ASRC).
There may be significant differences between IA models of absolute goodness or moral
rightness as opposed to moral betterness – for example, regarding whether the inputs and
output are required to be binary (good/not-good; right/not-right) and with respect to
Independence (see below, section 6). These issues cannot be pursued here.
It might be argued that certain pairs of items fail to meet a threshold test of assessability
with respect to comparative moral goodness – and that such failure is different from the
incomparability of assessable items. For example, it might be seen as nonsensical to ask
whether the number 17 is better, worse, equally good, or noncomparable to a particular
act. I add the caveat ‘appropriate for assessment’ to allow for such a threshold test.
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The membership of N depends on the particular IA view being
modelled. It is appealing to think that moral facts are true absolutely,
and true in virtue of what all persons (under idealized conditions) would
prefer. This is indeed the position of Smith, Firth and Railton. On this
view, N consists of all existing persons. Alternatively, N might be a proper
subset of existing persons – for example, all existing human persons, or (on
a relativist view) all persons within a given society. Except at one juncture,
noted below, these differences in the specification of N will not matter to
my analysis.
(3) I assume that advisors’ preferences are the grounding for moral
goodness just in case they meet the following conditions: the preferences
must be ‘rational’, ‘well-informed’ and ‘impartial’. (As a shorthand, I will
refer to these conditions, collectively, as the ‘idealizing’ conditions, and
preferences meeting them as ‘idealized’.) The conditions are deliberately
stated at a high level of generality – so as both to capture the features of
advisors’ preferences that are clearly demanded by our platitudes about
morality, and yet to leave open for further debate and investigation the
precise psychological content of ‘rational’, ‘well-informed’ and ‘impartial’.
Critics of an IA account of moral facts might argue that these
idealizing conditions are themselves, to some extent, normative – and that
this undercuts the naturalist ambition of the approach, namely to reduce
moral facts to ordinary, non-normative facts. But the proponent of the
account has an answer. She can concede that ‘impartial’, ‘well-informed’
and/or ‘rational’ are normative – concepts that we use in deliberating
about what ought to be done – but say that these concepts, like the concept
of moral goodness itself, refer to non-normative properties. Identifying the
psychological attributes corresponding to ‘impartial’, ‘well-informed’ and
‘rational’ involves the very same mixture of conceptual analysis and
empirical investigation by which we establish the natural basis for moral
goodness. The proponent can say: there is a fact of the matter regarding
what psychological state someone is in when he is ‘impartial’, ‘wellinformed’ and ‘rational’ – given the nature of various psychological states,
as per the laws of psychology, plus the platitudes about ‘impartiality’, etc.,
that anyone using these normative concepts grasps. In turn, the idealized
advisors are individuals in that psychological state; and moral goodness
depends upon what such advisors prefer.
(4) I assume that the idealized preferences of each given advisor,
k, over S take the form of a quasiordering k-S . Thus I allow for an
advisor’s moral preferences to be incomplete, but not for intransitivities.
This is, in effect, a further specification of the term ‘rational’. I assert
that rationality requires, at least, formal coherence in the sense of
having a transitive, although perhaps incomplete, ranking. On the one
hand, powerful arguments have been mounted to show that rational
moral agents are permitted to rank some alternatives as noncomparable:
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x neither morally better than y, nor morally worse, nor equally good
(Adler 2012: 43–4). The rational permissibility of intransitive preferences
is on much shakier ground (Voorhoeve 2013).
The relations of strict preference, weak preference, indifference and
noncomparability corresponding to k-S are denoted, respectively, as Pk-S ,
Rk-S , Ik-S and NCk-S .
(5) Let PS denote a profile of moral preferences (1-S , . . . , N-S ). A
given PS is ‘admissible’ if it is possible (in the relevant sense) for advisors to
meet the idealizing conditions and have this profile of preferences. Let S
denote the set of admissible profiles. A moral aggregation function or rule
MS maps each admissible PS onto a moral goodness quasiordering M-S
of S, with PM-S , RM-S , IM-S and NCM-S now denoting the relations of strict
and weak preference, indifference and noncomparability corresponding
to M-S . Because M-S is a moral goodness quasiordering, we can equally
well say that these denote, respectively, the relations of moral betterness,
being at least as good as,14 equal goodness, and moral noncomparability
corresponding to M-S .
To avoid clutter, I will sometimes drop the ‘S’ superscript on k-S ,
M-S , PS , S , MS and the R, I¸ P, and NC relations associated with k-S and
M-S . However, where I do so, the reader should keep in mind that this
superscript is implicit. Moral preferences and profiles thereof are rankings
of a particular set S of items, and the associated set of possible profiles is
also indexed to S.
I will use M P to denote MS (PS ) – the moral goodness ranking onto
which profile PS (for short, P) is mapped by function MS (for short, M).
And I will use k P to denote the kth element of a given profile P. Again so
as to simplify notation, I drop the P subscripts on k P and M P where it is
clear from context which profile is intended.
(6) What does ‘possible’ mean, here?
The content of the set of possible preference profiles (here, S , the set
of profiles for situation S) is a topic of great importance to social choice
theory, typically referred to as the question of ‘domain’ definition. (Note
that S is the domain for the function MS , hence the term.) Aggregation
functions that are ruled out when combining certain axioms with a
universal domain of preferences may no longer be precluded if the
domain is restricted. Standard surveys of the field shine a spotlight on
the question of domain definition (Sen 1986; Campbell and Kelly 2002;
Gaertner 2002). However, there appears to have been little systematic
discussion by social choice theorists of the more philosophical topic: what
is the appropriate sense of the term ‘possible’ used to specify the domain
of preferences?

14

Item x is morally ‘at least as good as’ y iff it is either better than y or equally good as y.
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Philosophers of modality distinguish between different kinds of
possibility: for example, logical, conceptual, epistemic and metaphysical
(Divers 2002: ch. 1; Gendler and Hawthorne 2002; Huemer 2007; Egan
and Weatherson 2011; Kment 2012). These distinctions are themselves
contested, and it is well beyond the scope of this article to address them
in detail. It will suffice to say this: a state of affairs is metaphysically
possible just in case there is some possible world in which the state
of affairs obtains. Metaphysical possibility is fixed by the modal facts –
specifically, which worlds are genuinely members of the total collection of
possible worlds – just as ordinary facts are fixed by what is true about the
particular possible world that is the actual world. Metaphysical possibility
is to be contrasted with what we believe to be true in some possible
world, what our concepts seem to us to allow or preclude, and what
logic allows or precludes. Logical impossibility is fixed by the logical
connectives, and implies but is not implied by metaphysical impossibility:
it is logically possible that a three-sided figure has four angles, but
metaphysically impossible. Goldbach’s conjecture, that all even numbers
can be expressed as the sum of two primes, has never been proven or
disproven. It seems conceivable that either the conjecture or its negation
is true, and it is reasonable to believe either. But mathematical truths are
true in all possible worlds, and so either the conjecture is metaphysically
necessary and the negation impossible, or vice versa.
It is metaphysical possibility, I suggest, that determines the content of
S (for short, ). A given profile of moral preferences (1 , . . . , N ) is
a member of  just in case there is truly some possible world in which
advisor 1 meets the idealizing conditions and has the preferences over
S described by 1 and advisor 2 meets the idealizing conditions and
has the preferences over S described by 2 and . . . advisor N meets the
idealizing conditions and has the preferences over S described by N .
Why conceptualize  as the set of metaphysically possible profiles with
respect to S, rather than the set of logically, conceptually or epistemically
possible profiles? Recall the ambition of the IA account of normative
properties: to show how these properties, such as moral goodness, reduce
to natural facts, specifically facts about the (in some way) idealized
preferences of advisors. The moral aggregation function M is a kind of
law (or, even better, bridge principle) of nature, mapping certain naturally
occurring features of the world (advisors’ preferences) onto the facts about
moral goodness that these features determine. A putative M, to be a
genuine bridge principle, must be capable15 of mapping any P that might
naturally occur, onto a goodness ranking M . But whether a given P could
naturally occur is a question of metaphysical possibility: a question about
15

‘Capable’ within the limits of whichever axiomatic requirements there are (weak Pareto,
intermediate Pareto, etc.) that govern the aggregation of advisors’ preferences.
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which arrangements of advisors’ preferences are to be found somewhere
in the total collection of possible worlds, given the nature of preferences
and the nature of the idealizing conditions for the advisors.
To be more concrete: the advisors’ idealized preferences have certain
properties. On the IA account of moral facts, these are the properties
picked out by the totality of our truisms about normativity and
morality and about motivation, preferences and other features of human
psychology. These are the properties I am referring to with the terms
‘rational’, ‘well informed’ and ‘impartial’. Which properties these are is a
matter for empirical investigation; that may not be clear to us ab initio. And
it may turn out to be metaphysically impossible for a particular profile
P∗ of rankings of some S to have all of these properties. In no possible
world does a group of ‘well informed’, etc., advisors have that collection
of rankings. If so, P∗ should not be in . It is not the function of the
natural bridge principle M to operate on arrangements of preferences that
could never actually occur, just as it is not the function of an ordinary law
of nature (a causal regularity) to determine what an impossible state of
affairs or event would causally produce.
To be sure, IA theorists are not omniscient, and will therefore
have different beliefs about what is metaphysically possible. The formal
apparatus here is a partly specified model of the determination of
moral facts. It will be useful only to those theorists who already have
certain beliefs about such determination16 ; and, among those theorists,
will be further specified depending on what further beliefs they hold.
In particular, as we will see in section 4, differing beliefs among
IA theorists about what is ‘rational’ will yield quite different beliefs
about the metaphysical possibility of a community of advisors meeting
the idealizing conditions yet diverging in their rankings of a set of
alternatives. A theorist’s beliefs inevitably shape her modelling of the
phenomenon of interest (here, the determination of moral facts). But
it hardly follows that beliefs, thoughts or concepts are the target of
the model. A profile (1 , . . . , N ) belongs in , according to a given
IA theorist, if she believes the profile to be metaphysically possible.
This is certainly not the same as saying that  contains all profiles
which are epistemically possible, or which it is reasonable to believe are
metaphysically possible!
(7) In short: M maps each metaphysically possible (henceforth
‘possible’) profile P of moral preferences over the set S of items, onto a
goodness quasiordering of those items. This ranking, denoted M(P) or

16

For example, that moral facts are fixed by the preferences of advisors that are (inter alia)
rational in the sense of being transitive – as reflected in the requirement of the quasiArrovian setup that advisors’ rankings be quasiorderings.
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M P , specifies what the facts about moral goodness would be, were the
advisors to have the moral preferences set forth in profile P.
But where are the actual facts of moral goodness in this picture?
The answer is (relatively) straightforward. Let P∗ be the actual moral
preferences of the advisors. More precisely, since we are imposing
idealizing conditions on preferences that advisors might not actually
∗
∗
∗
meet, P∗ = (1 , . . . , N ), where k are the preferences of advisor k in
the nearest possible world – nearest to the actual world – in which all the
advisors meet the idealizing conditions. For short, I will refer to P∗ as the
advisors’ ‘actual idealized’ preferences. Actual moral goodness is given
by the ranking, M(P∗ ) = M P∗ , onto which this profile is mapped by the
moral aggregation function M.17
One question that can be raised at this point is why M should
be expected to operate on metaphysically possible profiles of idealized
preferences that are not the advisors’ actual idealized preferences. Why
not see the moral aggregation function for a given situation as having
a singleton domain, namely what advisors prefer in the nearest possible
world in which they meet the idealizing conditions?18
Suffice it to say that natural laws support counterfactuals (the
chemical law that salt dissolves in water tells us what would happen if this
packet of salt were dropped in that glass), and also that moral discourse
intelligibly asks questions regarding counterfactual moral requirements
or values, namely what would be morally right or morally better if certain
facts were otherwise. Both points suggest that  should include counteractual as well as actual idealized profiles, at least to some extent. M,
if genuinely the natural law by which moral facts arise from advisors’
preferences, should not only tell us that the actual comparative moral
goodness of the items in S is given by M(P∗ ) – with P∗ the advisors’
actual idealized preferences – but also that the moral goodness of the
items in S would be given by M(P), were P instead of P∗ to be the
17

18

If moral goodness is truly a kind of fact, then it can be modally qualified, like physical,
psychological and social facts. We can differentiate actual moral goodness from possible
moral goodness. And what (for the IA) theorist could be the difference between actual and
possible moral goodness, other than the difference between actual and possible advisor
preferences?
A robust view of rationality would have it that idealized advisors never differ in their
preferences. See below, section 4. A yet more robust variation would have it that advisors
in all possible worlds have the very same convergent preferences. In other words, 
contains but a single profile P. Such a view is highly contestable, but in any event does
not undermine what I have just said about actual goodness. On such a view, actual moral
goodness is still determined by the actual profile of advisors’ preferences. However, such
profile no longer varies across worlds.
This is just to ask whether moral aggregation should be modelled using a ‘single-profile’
or ‘multi-profile’ approach. The choice between the two approaches has been much
debated by social choice theorists (Roberts 1980; Fleurbaey and Mongin 2005).
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advisors’ preferences in the nearest possible world where the preferences
meet the idealizing conditions. Moreover, by including P as well as P∗
in its domain, the natural law M serves to explain why actual moral
goodness is given by M(P∗ ) – namely, that actual idealized preferences are
P∗ rather than P. Conversely, if M does not operate on counterfactual but
metaphysically possible profile P, then it is indeterminate what the moral
facts would be, were the advisors’ idealized preferences in the nearest
possible world to be P. But what grounds does the IA theorist have to
believe in such indeterminacy? 19
(8) What, now, are the constraints on M?
First, M must satisfy the axioms of Pareto indifference and weak Pareto
with respect to all admissible profiles of advisors’ moral preferences. If all
advisors are morally indifferent between two items, the two are equally
morally good. If all advisors strictly prefer one item to a second, the first
is morally better. That is: (a) If x Ik P y for all k, then x IM P y. (b) If x Pk P y for
all k, then x PM P y.
A key feature of the IA account is that the preferences of the advisors
in the stipulated community, under idealizing conditions, are constitutive
of the moral facts. It is not possible for the advisors, under those
conditions, to be collectively mistaken about the facts. This constitutive
role of the advisors’ preferences is captured by the weak Pareto and Pareto
indifference axioms. On other metaethical views, such axioms would be
problematic: there may be no community of persons relative to which
the moral goodness ranking needs to satisfy weak Pareto and Pareto
indifference. For example, if moral facts are constituted by God’s ranking
(with God a superhuman being who is not a person), the unanimous
preferences of any community of idealized persons might diverge from
moral goodness. Similarly, if goodness is a natural property with a
particular explanatory role, then (perhaps) any community of persons
could be collectively mistaken about how that property behaves – just as
we (perhaps) might all be mistaken about the laws of physics.
I do not build in strong Pareto as a foundational axiom of the IA
approach. Strong Pareto says: If x Rk P y for all k, and x Pj P y for some j, then
19

Admittedly, natural laws might be expected to operate only on counterfactuals that are
not ‘wildly’ unrealistic. Since the formal apparatus builds in the premise that the advisors
are actually existing persons, this qualification seems less applicable. Included in  are all
possible profiles of idealized preferences regarding S that this particular group of actual
persons might have – both their preferences in the nearest possible world in which they
all meet the idealizing conditions, and their idealized preferences in more distant worlds.
Yet more remote preferences belonging to a different community of advisors are not in
; and so ‘wild’ counterfactuals arising by supposing a change in this community are
already excluded. If the reader is not satisfied by this structural exclusion, she might
add an additional qualification that (1 , . . . , N ) is in  only if the world in which the
advisors have those preferences is not ‘too far’ from the actual world.
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x PM P y. While the moral weak Pareto and Pareto indifference axioms see
the unanimous strict preference or indifference of the advisors as sufficient
for, respectively, moral betterness or equal goodness, strong Pareto (to the
extent it goes beyond weak Pareto) identifies a condition of disagreement
among the advisors as nonetheless sufficient for moral betterness. It is not
clear that the IA theorist should be committed to this from the start.
To be sure, it may emerge that a moral aggregation function entailed
by other axioms ends up satisfying the strong Pareto axiom. Indeed, as we
shall see, this is true of the Unanimity Rule. In other words, it may turn out
to be the case that the IA theorist is logically required to endorse the strong
Pareto axiom as the result of other principles that she finds immediately
appealing. But because strong Pareto does not directly express a key
commitment of the IA approach – in particular, that advisors’ preferences
are constitutive of moral facts – I do not incorporate strong Pareto into the
quasi-Arrovian setup itself.
By contrast, strong Pareto has direct appeal in the context of interest
aggregation (Adler 2012: ch. 5). And perhaps it also does for voting
rules. The absence of a foundational commitment to strong Pareto is
one important difference between the metaethical variant of preference
aggregation and these other variants (cf. Rabinowicz 2015).
A fourth kind of Pareto principle should now be mentioned. So as to
avoid terminological confusion, let’s call this ‘intermediate Pareto’: If x Rk P y
for all k, then x RM P y.
Like weak Pareto and Pareto indifference, intermediate Pareto is
intuitively attractive. Imagine that all advisors weakly prefer x to y. This
means, first, that no advisor strictly prefers y to x. But then the moral
aggregation function should surely not rank y as better than x. To do so
would contradict the universal view of the advisors. Observe, second,
that if all advisors weakly prefer x to y then no advisor counts the two as
noncomparable. But then, surely, the moral aggregation function should
not rank the two as noncomparable – again, this would be to contradict
the universal view of the advisors.20
Note that intermediate Pareto implies Pareto indifference. I therefore
describe the quasi-Arrovian setup as including the axioms of weak
Pareto and intermediate Pareto rather than (redundantly) weak Pareto,
intermediate Pareto and Pareto indifference.

20

I am indebted to an editor of Economics and Philosophy for this defence of intermediate
Pareto. I find it to be quite powerful. Some readers may, however, resist it – seeing
moral noncomparability as a plausible default when advisors disagree. Consider the
case where some advisors strictly prefer x to y, while all others are indifferent – a kind
of disagreement. In this case, some readers may find it plausible that the alternatives
are morally noncomparable. In note 30 below, I briefly discuss the implications for the
analysis of replacing intermediate Pareto with Pareto indifference.
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(9) Second, M satisfies Anonymity. Each advisor has equal weight in
determining moral facts – assuming her preferences meet the idealization
screen. Formally, if the preferences in profile P∗ are a permutation of the
preferences in profile P, M(P) = M(P∗ ). Again, this flows from the view
that the community’s preferences are constitutive of moral facts. If these
were, rather, merely evidence of moral facts grounded in some other way,
some community members might have special expertise with respect to
these facts, and Anonymity would be unwarranted.
(10) Third, MS must satisfy a requirement of Across-Situation Ranking
Consistency (ASRC). Note that the S superscript has been made explicit; it
will be significant in what follows.
ASRC expresses several ideas. First, it is advisors’ ordinal preferences
that determine the moral goodness ranking of alternatives. To be sure,
that idea also informs the structure of the moral aggregation function:
the function for a given situation operates upon a profile of advisor
ordinal rankings (quasiorderings) of that situation. However, there is
nothing in the ordinality of the inputs to MS which requires MS , the moral
aggregation function for situation S, to be similar in any further sense to
MT , the moral aggregation function for a different situation T. The formal
setup, thus far, allows the choice of moral aggregation function for a given
situation to hinge upon the specific features of the alternatives being compared. For example, if S and T each have three elements, with the elements
of S actions of a particular sort, and the elements of T actions of a different
sort, the aggregation functions for S and T might be quite dissimilar.
The IA theorist would (I think) resist such differentiation – which
is in tension with the core claim of IA theory, that advisors’ preferences
are constitutive, and wholly so, of moral goodness. It is just the pattern
of advisor preferences, not further facts about the alternatives, that
fixes the goodness ranking; nor are these further facts ‘smuggled in’ by
having them determine the specific form of the function from advisors’
preferences to the goodness ranking. This is the second idea expressed by
ASRC – that if advisors have ‘the same’ preferences in two situations, the
moral goodness ranking should be ‘the same’. We now go back to the first
idea, ordinality: advisors’ preferences are ‘the same’ in two situations if
their ordinal preferences are ‘the same’.
In short, ASRC says that if each advisor has ‘the same’ ordinal ranking
of the items in S as in T, then the moral goodness ranking should be ‘the
same’. Formally: Let #S = #T, and let π (·) be a bijection from situation S
to situation T. Let PS be a profile of preferences in S and QT a profile
of preferences in T . Let MS be the moral aggregation function for S
and MT for T, such that MS (PS ) is a quasiordering of S, and MT (QT ) a
quasiordering of T. Let RM P denote the morally-at-least-as-good relation
corresponding to MS (PS ), and similarly RM Q that relation corresponding
to MT (QT ).
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If for all x, y in S and for every advisor k, x Rk P y iff π (x) Rk Q π (y) and
y R P x iff π (y) Rk Q π (x), then: for all x, y in S, x RM P y iff π (x) RM Q π (y) and
y RM P x iff π (y) RM Q π (x).
(11) The final element of the quasi-Arrovian setup is Independence. It
says, roughly, that the comparative moral goodness of two items depends
just on advisors’ pairwise rankings of those items. Independence could
be expressed in an inter-situational version – namely that if advisors all
have the very same rankings of the x-y pair as the z-w pair, with x-y
and z-w belonging to the same situation or two different situations, the
moral goodness ranking of the two must be the same. However, since
across-situational consistency is already brought into play by ASRC, and
since it will be illuminating to highlight the axiomatic work done by this
inter-situational requirement as contrasted with Independence in the less
ambitious, intra-situational sense, I formalize Independence as an intrasituational axiom. For any given pair of items in some situation, if each advisor’s ranking of the two items under profile P is the same as her ranking
under profile Q, the moral aggregation function must map the two profiles
onto the same comparative moral goodness ranking of the two items.
Formally: Let x and y be any two alternatives from S, P and Q any two
profiles of preferences in S . If for all k, x Rk P y iff x Rk Q y and y Rk P x iff y
Rk Q x, then: x RM P y iff x RM Q y and y RM P x iff y RM Q x.
Independence is, of course, a key element of the original Arrow
framework. It is also the most controversial. Why take it on board? Let
me hold this question in abeyance until section 6. We proceed by, first,
adopting the quasi-Arrovian setup, including Independence and seeing
its implications for M; and, then, in section 6 considering the arguments
for and against this axiom.21
k

4. THE QUASI-ARROVIAN SETUP PLUS ORDERING CONVERGENCE
‘Ordering Convergence’ is a (highly restrictive) stipulation regarding the
admissibility of preference profiles. It says that a profile is a member
of  only if each component preference has the very same ranking of the
21

Last, how does this setup relate to existing scholarship on ‘extensive social choice’?
(Ooghe and Lauwers 2005, and sources cited therein). In that literature, a community of
‘planners’ – these might be interpreted as my ‘advisors’ – ranks outcomes, each using
her own social welfare function. That is, each advisor has moral preferences that, in
their substance, endorse Preferentism about Well-Being and the Principle of Personal
Good. She arrives at her moral ranking, k , by using an advisor-specific social welfare
function Wk to solve the interest-aggregation problem that those with these substantive
moral commitments face.
In other words, extensive social choice combines metaethical aggregation (as per an IA
approach to metaethics) with interest aggregation (with respect to the substantive content
of moral values). The framework here is more general, since it allows but does not require
that advisors have moral preferences that are welfarist in their content.
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set S of items. Let a statement of identity between moral preferences, k =
l , mean that: for all x, y in S, x Rk y iff x Rl y. Ordering Convergence, thus,
says: P is an element of  only if 1 P = 2 P = ··· = N P .
If Ordering Convergence is adopted, the problem of moral
aggregation becomes trivial. By immediate upshot of Pareto indifference
and weak Pareto, M(P) must be some extension of the common advisor
ranking.22 If advisors have complete moral preferences, M(P) must simply
be the common ranking.23
Various IA theorists, most prominently Michael Smith,24 have argued
for the convergence of advisors’ preferences. Do his arguments indeed
make a persuasive case for Ordering Convergence?
Ordering Convergence should not be conflated with a particular
aggregation rule M or family of such rules. In the next part of this article,
I will discuss an aggregation rule, the Unanimity Rule, which is such that
the weak convergence of advisors’ preferences in ranking any two items
is a necessary condition for those items to be morally comparable (one
better than the other or the two equally good, rather than noncomparable).
But convergence, here, is a feature of the rule – not of . As we shall
see, the Unanimity Rule operates perfectly well on preference profiles
that include non-identical rankings – indeed, even if  contains every
logically possible profile of advisor preferences.25 The Unanimity Rule is a
methodology for aggregating advisors’ preferences, perhaps non-identical
– a methodology that has the feature of propagating non-comparability
from preference divergence – while Ordering Convergence is the view
that a profile with divergent preferences is just metaphysically impossible
from the outset.
Smith writes: ‘the truth of a normative reason claim requires a
convergence in the desires of fully rational agents’ (Smith 1994: 173). This
statement, standing alone, does not show that Smith endorses Ordering
Convergence. Rather, it says that if there is to be genuine normative reason
in favour of one option rather than a second, then fully rational agents
must desire the first.
22
23

24
25

That is, for all x, y: if x I1 y (and thus x I2 y, x I3 y, . . . ), then x IM y; and if x P1 y (and thus
x P2 y, x P3 y, . . . ), then x PM y.
M(P) = 1 P (= 2 P = ··· = N P ). Absent completeness in the advisors’ preferences,
Ordering Convergence in the quasi-Arrovian setup does not imply this, but rather the
slighter weaker result in footnote 22. Someone who embraces Ordering Convergence
might rebel at this weaker result, since it allows that one item could be morally at least as
good as a second even if all advisors count the two as noncomparable. This could be ruled
out by adding an axiom that: if x NCk y for all k, then x NCM y. Ordering Convergence in
the quasi-Arrovian setup plus this axiom entails M(P) = 1 P (= 2 P = ··· = N P ) even
with incomplete advisor preferences.
See also Firth (1952); Jackson (1998: 137); but see Brandt (1955).
This is ‘Universal Domain’, defined in section 5.
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At other points, however, Smith tries to show that all idealized
advisors must have the very same preferences. To argue thus is, clearly,
to put forth the case for Ordering Convergence. Smith writes:
[T]o be fully rational an agent must not be suffering from the effects of
any physical or emotional disturbance, she must have no false beliefs, she
must have all relevant true beliefs, and she must have a systematically
justifiable set of desires, that is, a set of desires that is maximally coherent
and unified. Furthermore, I argue that it is part of what we mean when we
say that a set of desires is systematically justifiable that the desires that are
elements in that set are desires that other people too would have if they had
a systematically justifiable set of desires. Fully rational agents converge in
the desires that they have, and converge by definition, because it is part of
what we mean by the rational justification of our desires that people who
have such desires have a justification for them that other people also could
see to be a justification. (Smith 1997: 89)

More specifically, we might understand Smith as leveraging the rationality
component of idealization into an argument for Ordering Convergence.
Is the argument persuasive? Smith asserts that ‘rational’ desires/preferences have the following feature (call it SJ): ‘people who have
such desires have a justification for them that other people also could see
to be a justification’. Assume, now, that any two advisors k and l have
the same full information, including knowledge about what each other’s
preferences are; moreover, each has SJ preferences; finally, the two have
common knowledge of all this. Then if k  l , k will reason: ‘I can’t
see my current preferences as justifiable to l, since l, with the very same
information as me, and reasoning just as well, has different preferences’.
Note that this argument works only if ‘having a justification for my
desires’ means ‘having a non-agent-centred justification’ – a justification
that excludes indexicals. Consider a case in which k prefers Renaissance
painting to modern painting, and l has the opposite preference. If
k can provide a systematic justification for the preference by saying,
‘Renaissance painting better fits with my deepest aesthetic values, the ones
that have been inculcated in me since childhood’, and l by saying ‘modern
painting fits better with my deepest aesthetic values, the ones inculcated
in me since childhood’, the two can have full and common knowledge of
everything relevant, including the requirement of systematic justification,
and still end up with different preferences.
So let us revise SJ to NACSJ (non-agent-centred, systematically
justifiable). If ‘rationality’ requires NACSJ preferences, and if the
idealizing conditions for moral facts require the advisors to have
preferences that are NACSJ and sufficiently informed, we have a
good argument for Ordering Convergence. On these suppositions, it is
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metaphysically impossible for rational and well informed advisors to have
divergent moral preferences.
A difficulty here is that nothing in the concept of ‘rationality’
clearly entails the NACSJ feature. A long tradition in thinking about
rationality, going back to Hume, and embodied in modern economics and
decision theory, thinks of ‘rationality’ in purely formal terms (Hooker and
Streumer 2004; Weirich 2004). Such a view identifies conditions regarding
the internal coherence of preferences, such as transitivity, reflexivity,
consistency across choice situations, or the axioms of expected utility
theory; and then says that satisfying such conditions is not only necessary,
but sufficient, for someone’s preferences to be rational. The view is ‘purely
formal’ because these coherence conditions permit preferences that do
not conform to any commonly shared standard of desirability. I can
‘rationally’ prefer something ‘just because I want it’. Indeed, the purely
formal view says that ‘rational’ preferences may seem substantively
crazy – such as a preference to eat a saucer of mud, or Hume’s example of
preferring the destruction of the world to scratching my finger.
Nor does introducing the further idealizing element of ‘impartiality’
(as a condition on moral preferences) transform this formal conception
of rationality into one that incorporates NACSJ. There’s no apparent
incoherence in Sarah explaining her impartial preferences to herself in
Sarah-centred terms: ‘Abstracting from my own position in society, I
morally prefer much higher income-tax rates that would move us toward
a much more equal distribution of well-being, even at substantial cost to
overall well-being; and the reason I have this preference is because welfare
egalitarianism fits my deepest values, the ones that my parents and I have
always held.’
Smith might respond that the properties of preferences picked out
by the concept of ‘rationality’ may not be obvious to those using that
concept; and that, indeed, those properties include the NACSJ property,
even though many who use that concept mistakenly think otherwise.
(This would be like a mistaken belief that water is not H2 O.) To be sure,
Smith himself is not omniscient; he cannot know for sure which properties
our normative language refers to. But he can say that he reasonably believes
‘rational’ preferences to be NACSJ; and that if preferences do indeed have
this feature, Ordering Convergence follows.
Several other arguments for Ordering Convergence should be
mentioned. First, the relativistic IA theorist (who views moral statements
as true or false relative to one or another community, and sees the
preferences of idealized community members as the empirical basis for
the truth-value of such statements) might restrict the set of eligible
communities so that each satisfies Ordering Convergence. She might
argue that a community’s preferences can be the touchstone for a
relativized moral statement only if the community genuinely shares a
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moral code – and indeed does so in the strong sense required by Ordering
Convergence. Such an argument, of course, is not available to the nonrelativistic (absolutist) IA theorist.
Second, the non-relativistic IA theorist might allow that fully
informed and rational persons can have divergent moral preferences, but
include only humans in the community of advisors, and seek to make the
empirical showing that idealized humans (given their genetic makeup)
converge in what they morally prefer.
Finally, consider the disjunctive claim: either Ordering Convergence
is true, or there are no moral facts. At one point, Smith makes comments
suggestive of this claim.
The truth of [Smith’s account] depends on more than mere conceptual
analysis [that is, the non-relativistic IA analysis of normative reasons],
it depends, as well, on the substantive fact that there is a set of desires
that we would all converge upon if we had a set of desires that was
maximally informed, coherent and unified. Even if the conceptual analysis
is impeccable, absent the power of rational argument – that is, absent the
power of information, together with considerations of coherence and unity
– to elicit common desires in us, [Smith’s account] entails that there are no
moral facts at all. (Smith 2004: 205)

The disjunctive claim, plus the truism of ordinary moral discourse that
there are moral facts, would imply Ordering Convergence.
However, absent independent reason to accept Ordering Convergence, there is no reason to believe the disjunctive claim. Why believe
it? (1) The disjunctive claim might, conceivably, be a feature of moral
goodness that we discover by investigating the structure of moral
aggregation. But there is no such discovery to be had. There exist moral
aggregation functions – in particular, the Unanimity Rule – that yield facts
about comparative moral goodness even without Ordering Convergence.
(2) The disjunctive claim might express a truism of ordinary moral
thought that any metaethical view should try to respect. But does it?
Who (except for a few IA theorists) finds it pretheoretically obvious
that convergence of moral preferences is the only alternative to moral
nihilism? Indeed, many of us find the negation of the disjunctive claim
to be pretheoretically obvious – observing moral disagreement all around
us, and yet finding ourselves asserting moral truths in the teeth of such
disagreement.
To sum up: the non-relativistic IA theorist who includes all persons
(not just humans) in the community of advisors has one reasonable basis
for endorsing Ordering Convergence – for believing that only profiles
with identical moral preferences are metaphysically possible. That basis
is the reasonable belief that the property of preferences picked out by the
concept of rationality forces convergence.
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However, since it is also reasonable to deny that ‘rational’ persons
need to see their choices as systematically justifiable, or reasonable
to accept agent-centred rationales as one such justification, it is also
reasonable to reject Ordering Convergence. What doing so means for
moral aggregation is the question we now consider.
5. THE QUASI-ARROVIAN SETUP WITH DIVERGENT PREFERENCES
For a given situation S, let UDS be the set of all N-fold concatenations of
quasiorderings of S. Universal Domain holds true in a given situation S iff
S = UDS . S , the domain for the moral aggregation function, includes
every combination of formally well-behaved rankings of the situation.
Whether the IA theorist believes that Universal Domain holds true in
a given situation depends, of course, on her beliefs about the properties
picked out by the terms ‘rational’, ‘well-informed’ and ‘impartial’. It also
depends on the nature of the situation. For example, let S = {x, y, z} be such
that the three options are identical except that x involves the torturing
of no babies, y the torturing of 10 and z the torturing of 100,000. Then
(absent a radical disjunction between the idealized advisors and what we
observe among non-ideal moral thinkers) it is hard to believe that any
advisor would prefer z to y to x, let alone that all the elements of UDS
are metaphysically possible. By contrast, consider T = {x∗ , y∗ , z∗ }, with the
three options otherwise identical except that x∗ causes non-fatal physical
harm to a group of persons, y∗ a substantial loss of liberty and z∗ pain
and suffering. Then (since we do not observe non-ideal moral thinkers
agreeing on a strict ranking of any two of these harms) it is easier to believe
that all patterns of preference among x∗ , y∗ and z∗ are possible for the ideal
advisors.
I first discuss the implications of Universal Domain. If Universal
Domain holds true in a given situation S (and #S > 2), the moral
aggregation function for that situation must be the Unanimity Rule.
Conversely, if S has a narrower domain, other moral aggregation
functions – for example, majority vote – may be consistent with
the intra-situational axioms of the quasi-Arrovian Setup (regardless of
#S): weak Pareto, intermediate Pareto, Anonymity and Independence.
However, by adding Across-Situation Ranking Consistency (ASRC), and
an assumption that Universal Domain holds true in a sufficient number of
situations, we force the moral aggregation function in every situation (with
#S > 2) to be the Unanimity Rule.
The surprising result of this section is that the connection between
moral goodness and convergent moral preferences emerges not from a
demanding view of rationality (such as Michael Smith’s), but from a
very different direction. If rationality (and the other idealizing conditions)
are loose enough that a very wide diversity of advisor preferences are
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metaphysically possible in a sufficient range of situations, the combination
of the intra- and inter-situational axioms of the quasi-Arrovian setup
makes convergence a necessary condition for moral comparability.
5.1. Universal Domain Implies the Unanimity Rule
In the original Arrow setup, both the individual inputs and the collective
output are required to be complete orderings. Arrow shows that there
is no aggregation function satisfying this requirement plus Universal
Domain, Independence, weak Pareto and Non-Dictatorship, where there
are three or more alternatives being ranked and at least two persons in the
population.
In an important contribution, Weymark (1984) shows that this
impossibility dissipates if the collective output is allowed to be a
quasiordering. Weymark, specifically, departs from the Arrow framework
by (1) allowing the collective output to be incomplete, albeit retaining
the requirement that individuals’ inputs be complete; (2) substituting
strong Pareto for weak Pareto; and (3) strengthening Non-Dictatorship
to Anonymity. Weymark then proves that the only aggregation function
possible in his modified framework is the following: alternative x at least
as good as alternative y iff everyone weakly prefers x to y.
I will term this the Unanimity Rule.26 Transposed into the context of
moral aggregation, it says that one alternative is morally at least as good
as a second iff all the advisors weakly prefer the first to the second. That
is: x RM P y iff x Rk P y for all k.
In the Appendix, I demonstrate that the only moral aggregation
function consistent with the quasi-Arrovian setup (dropping the intersituational axiom of ASRC, not needed for this result27 ) plus Universal
Domain is the Unanimity Rule, if more than two alternatives are being
compared with respect to moral goodness.
Theorem. If #S > 2, and Universal Domain holds true in S, a
moral aggregation function MS satisfies weak Pareto, intermediate Pareto,
Independence and Anonymity iff MS is the Unanimity Rule.
Proof. See Appendix.
This characterization result differs from that of Weymark (1984) in
two ways. First, both the collective output (the moral goodness ranking)
26

27

This rule is better known to social choice theorists as the ‘strong Pareto’ rule, which is
indeed the term that Weymark uses. So as to avoid any risk that readers from other fields
might confuse this rule with the strong Pareto axiom, I have, for purposes of this article,
picked a different name for the rule.
Clearly, adding back ASRC does not create an impossibility. If the moral aggregation rule
MS for every situation S is the Unanimity Rule, MS satisfies weak Pareto, intermediate
Pareto, Independence, Anonymity and ASRC. whether or not Universal Domain is true
of S.
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and the individuals’ inputs (the advisors’ preferences) are quasiorderings,
possibly incomplete. Second, the strong Pareto axiom is not used in the
characterization. Instead, the Pareto axioms that I use are the two ‘built
into’ the quasi-Arrovian setup: weak Pareto and intermediate Pareto.28
Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that the Unanimity Rule satisfies
the strong Pareto axiom. A different formulation of the Unanimity Rule,
logically equivalent to that given above, is as follows. (1) Two alternatives
are morally equally good iff all advisors are indifferent between them. (x
IM P y iff x Ik P y for all k.) (2) One alternative is morally better than a second
iff at least one advisor strictly prefers the first and all others weakly prefer
it. (x PM P y iff x Pi P y for some i and x Rk P y for all k.) (3) Two alternatives
are morally noncomparable otherwise. (x NCM P y iff either (a) x NCk P y for
some k or (b) there exist k, l, such that x Pk P y and y Pl P x.)
It is immediately evident from prong (2) of this equivalent
formulation of the Unanimity Rule that strong Pareto is satisfied. One
lesson of the Theorem, therefore, is that the IA theorist who endorses the
elements of the quasi-Arrovian setup is logically committed to endorsing
strong Pareto, in a situation with Universal Domain – even though she
may not find that strong Pareto has immediate intuitive appeal.
A second, striking feature of the Unanimity Rule is that it satisfies
‘Output Convergence’ (by contrast with Ordering Convergence). Output
Convergence: Two alternatives x and y are morally comparable (either
one better than the second, or the two equally good) only if there is
one of the two alternatives that is weakly preferred to the other by
all the advisors. Equivalently, if even one advisor counts x and y as
noncomparable, or if two advisors have conflicting strict preferences – one
strictly preferring x to y, the second strictly preferring y to x – then the
alternatives are noncomparable. As can be seen from the initial statement
of the Unanimity Rule, or from prong (3) of the equivalent formulation,
this Rule does indeed satisfy Output Convergence.
Thus a corollary of the Theorem is the following.
Corollary. If #S > 2, and Universal Domain holds true in S, a
moral aggregation function MS satisfies weak Pareto, intermediate Pareto,
Independence and Anonymity only if MS satisfies Output Convergence.29
28

29

A variation of the Theorem for the case where advisors’ preferences are required to be
complete also holds true. In this variation, Universal Domain is dropped, and instead
it is supposed that S is all N-fold concatenations of complete quasiorderings of S. This
variation is not demonstrated separately in the Appendix, but the proof there can be easily
adapted to prove it. Lemmas 1 and 2 continue to apply. From the premise that N is the
unique β-oligarchy and that advisors’ rankings are complete, it follows immediately that:
x RM P y implies that x Rk P y for all k ∈ N.
Adding intermediate Pareto, the characterization of the Unanimity Rule follows.
An in-depth analysis of the #S = 2 case with the quasi-Arrovian setup and Universal
Domain will not be undertaken here. It should be noted that if #S = 2, there are moral
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The Theorem and Corollary will not be surprising to social choice
theorists, who are familiar with the dramatic implications of the
combination of Independence and Universal Domain. But metaethicists
may find it puzzling. Think of the results this way. Independence imposes
an inter-profile, intra-situational consistency constraint: a constraint
regarding how the moral goodness ranking varies with the different
possible profiles of advisor preferences for a given situation. The more
such possible profiles there are, the stronger the ‘bite’ of this constraint.
At the limit, if all profiles are possible – Universal Domain – the class of
eligible moral aggregation functions is sharply circumscribed.
Ordering Convergence rules out non-identical preferences from the
get-go. By contrast, the Theorem and Corollary show how convergence
of moral preferences in a different sense – Output Convergence – is
a consequence of the quasi-Arrovian structure of moral aggregation.
Ironically, a tolerance for any pattern of disagreement or agreement
among the advisors, at the outset, yields the Unanimity Rule, and
therewith Output Convergence: moral noncomparability between two
alternatives absent a consensus among the advisors in identifying one of
the two as at least weakly preferable to the other.
Output Convergence does not go so far as to require that all advisors
have exactly the same ranking of two items for moral comparability. In
particular, it allows that one item can be morally better than a second
if some advisors strictly prefer the first, while all others are indifferent
between the two. (That is to say, Output Convergence and strong Pareto
are logically consistent.) Thus we might say that Output Convergence
makes the weak convergence of advisor preferences with respect to two
items a precondition for their moral comparability.
Note finally that the Unanimity Rule is neutral between alternatives:
the pattern of advisor preferences that yields moral betterness, equal
goodness or incomparability between two alternatives is the same for any
two. This is, intuitively, as it should be; and the Theorem shows neutrality
to be an implication of the quasi-Arrovian setup plus Universal Domain,
rather than needing to be stated as a further axiom.30

30

aggregation functions that satisfy weak Pareto, intermediate Pareto, Independence and
Anonymity but do not satisfy Output Convergence. This is true, for example, of the
majoritarian function M∗ discussed below in section 5.2. With #S = 2, M∗ will clearly yield
a quasiordering of S and satisfy all the axioms just stated except Output Convergence.
(Transitivity says: if x is at least as good as y and y is at least as good as z, then x is at least
as good as z. This is applicable to the case of #S = 2 since x, y, and z need not be distinct.)
By contrast, what is observed in section 5.2 is that if #S can exceed 2, M∗ is sure to yield
a quasiordering of S only if S satisfies a domain restriction such as ‘extremal restriction’
or ‘single-peakedness’ whereby S is a proper subset of UDS .
How do the results of this section change if Pareto indifference is substituted for
intermediate Pareto? In an unpublished companion paper, I prove that if #S > 2, and
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5.2. The Implications of Relaxing Universal Domain

Let us continue to hold to one side the ASRC axiom. Where Universal
Domain is not true in a given situation – if S is only a proper subset
of UDS – to what extent are moral aggregation functions other than the
Unanimity Rule consistent with the rest of the quasi-Arrovian setup?
This is a large question which I can hardly begin to answer
here. Rather, I will use the example of majority vote to illustrate the
possibility of a non-Unanimity Rule that is consistent with the intrasituational axioms of the quasi-Arrovian setup (those except ASRC), given
sufficiently narrow domains. Majority vote is worth singling out because
much of the existing social-choice literature that relaxes Universal Domain
but retains Independence has focused on this procedure. Moreover,
majority vote adds an important perspective to the discussion thus far
of convergence.
Define the majoritarian function M∗ as follows: for every x and y in S,
x is morally at least as good as y iff the number of advisors who strictly
prefer x to y is at least as large as the number who strictly prefer y to x.
M∗ clearly satisfies weak Pareto, intermediate Pareto, Anonymity
and Independence. Moreover – now borrowing from the literature – it
can be shown that if S is appropriately limited, every profile in S
will be mapped by M∗ onto a quasiordering of S (indeed, a complete
ordering). In particular, this will be true if S is such that in every
profile P, every advisor has a complete ranking of the alternatives and
the advisors’ rankings satisfy a condition known as ‘extremal restriction’.
It will also be true if N is odd and S is such that in every profile
P, every advisor has a complete ranking of the alternatives and the
advisors’ rankings are ‘single peaked’ (Sen 1970, 1986; Gaertner 2002,
2009). The intransitivities of combining M∗ with a universal domain of
preferences – so famously illustrated by social choice theorists beginning
with Condorcet – disappear as S shrinks.
The domain restrictions for M∗ just mentioned do not, of course, entail
Ordering Convergence. They admit profiles in which advisors have nonidentical rankings of the items in S.

Universal Domain holds true in S, a moral aggregation function MS satisfies weak Pareto,
Pareto indifference, Independence and Anonymity iff MS is one of a broader family of
rules that includes but is not limited to the Unanimity Rule. The rules in this family all
satisfy Output Convergence and Neutrality but not necessarily strong Pareto. Consider,
in particular, the rule which says: alternative x is better than alternative y iff all advisors
strictly prefer x to y; alternatives x and y are equally morally good iff all advisors are
indifferent between the two; otherwise x and y are noncomparable. This rule yields a
quasiordering of any situation, even with Universal Domain, and satisfies weak Pareto,
Pareto indifference, Independence and Anonymity but not intermediate Pareto or strong
Pareto; and it conforms to Output Convergence and Neutrality.
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Moreover, by contrast with the Unanimity Rule, M∗ does not satisfy
Output Convergence. If more than half of the advisors strictly morally
prefer x to y, x will be ranked better than y regardless of what the other
advisors prefer.
However, consider what happens if we add the ASRC axiom, plus
the supposition that Universal Domain is true in a sufficient number of
situations. Specifically, for any situation S, there is at least one situation T
such that #S = #T and such that Universal Domain holds true of T. Then the
moral aggregation function for every situation with cardinality greater than two
must be the Unanimity Rule. Why? There is a one-to-one correspondence
between the elements of S and the elements of T. Moreover, because
Universal Domain is true of T, it follows that for any profile PS , there is an
isomorphic profile PT – whereby each advisor’s ranking of the elements
of S is the same as her ranking of the corresponding elements of T. By the
characterization theorem above, if #T >2, the mapping MT from PT onto
the moral goodness ranking of T must be the Unanimity Rule. By ASRC,
the mapping MS from PS onto the moral goodness ranking of S must be
the very same rule.

6. BEYOND THE QUASI-ARROVIAN SETUP
The analysis to this point has worked within the quasi-Arrovian setup.
The setup might be revised in various ways, either by changing the
requirement that advisors’ inputs and the moral output be quasiorderings,
or by changing the axioms. I will here briefly discuss the latter type
of revision – in particular dropping Independence or Across-Situation
Ranking Consistency (ASRC). It is harder to see how the IA theorist
could reject the Pareto axioms (which express the constitutive role of
the community of idealized advisors in determining moral facts); or the
Anonymity axiom (which expresses the equal role within that community
of each advisor).
One possible revision to the quasi-Arrovian setup is to drop
Independence but not ASRC. The setup, thus amended, retains the idea
that advisors’ ordinal preferences determine the moral goodness ranking
of a set of alternatives. But it does not require that such determination
occur on a pairwise basis. The comparative moral goodness of two
alternatives need not be fixed by the advisors’ ranking of those two,
taken alone. Instead, it is the advisor-by-advisor ordinal preferences
with respect to the entire set of alternatives that fix the moral goodness
ranking of that entire set. The social choice literature describes aggregation
functions that satisfy ASRC while violating Independence, the most
famous being the Borda rule (Brams and Fishburn 2002; Pattanaik
2002).
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A second amendment is to drop both Independence and ASRC.31
The idea, here, would be that moral goodness depends in part on nonordinal features of advisors’ preferences – so that the pairwise ranking of
two alternatives cannot be fixed by advisors’ ordinal rankings of the two
(Independence) and indeed the ranking of a whole set of items cannot be
fixed by advisors’ ordinal rankings of the whole set (ASRC).
Imagine, specifically, that moral aggregation proceeds using an
approach analogous to the social-welfare-function (SWF) framework –
which, as mentioned earlier, is a standard tool developed by social
choice theorists for the context of interest aggregation. A given alternative
is mapped onto a vector of ‘utility’ numbers. With N individuals in
the population whose well-being is of concern, a given alternative x is
mapped onto the vector (list) of numbers (u1 (x), . . . , uN (x)), with ui (x) the
utility number representing the well-being of individual i given x. An SWF
is a rule for ranking such vectors (Bossert and Weymark 2004; Adler 2012;
Weymark 2016).
By analogy, the IA theorist might think that advisors’ ordinal rankings
of a given situation plus the relevant non-ordinal features of their
preferences can be summarized in moral utility numbers. On this view,
moral aggregation proceeds by translating a profile of advisor preferences
over the alternatives into a vector of moral utility numbers, one for each
alternative; and then by using some rule to rank these vectors. Because the
moral utility numbers are capturing more than advisors’ ordinal rankings
of the situation, neither Independence nor ASRC can be expected to hold.
Should we indeed drop Independence, or Independence and ASRC,
from our model of moral aggregation? Or is the quasi-Arrovian
framework correct to include both axioms? How the IA theorist should
answer these questions depends upon what it is reasonable to believe
concerning the grounding of moral facts. Any IA theorist believes certain
metaethical propositions that are basic to the IA approach: for example,
that moral statements can be true or false, that there are moral facts,
that moral facts are grounded in natural (physical, psychological or
social) facts, and more specifically are grounded in the preferences of a
group of idealized advisors. The IA theorist believes all this in virtue of
considerations mentioned earlier, and is reasonable to do so. Now we can
ask: Would it be epistemically more reasonable to believe that preferences
constitute moral facts in the specific manner set forth by Independence
and ASRC, or instead to deny this?
The metaethical discussion required for a full treatment of this
question is well beyond what can be accomplished here. Let me simply
make some initial, suggestive remarks.
31

It is very hard to see why the IA theorist would seriously entertain a third possibility:
retaining Independence but dropping ASRC.
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To begin, there is reason to doubt that there are non-ordinal features of
the advisors’ preferences, relevant to the determination of moral goodness
and mirrored in moral utility numbers. This challenge to ASRC and
Independence seems weak. Moral goodness is (as a matter of ordinary
moral discourse) a purely ordinal property: we think of actions, outcomes
and other items subject to moral assessment as being better or worse than
each other, not as possessing degrees of moral goodness. So why wouldn’t
the advisors themselves, thinking morally, also have preferences that are
purely ordinal?
There is an important disanalogy, here, between interest aggregation
and moral aggregation. Ordinary discourse about well-being supports
comparisons of well-being differences. It would be unexceptionable to say
something like: ‘Ron should spend that extra money on headache therapy,
not the big screen TV, because getting rid of his chronic headaches will
make a much bigger difference to his life than a larger TV.’ Moreover,
ordinary discourse about well-being does not share the scepticism about
interpersonal comparisons that some economists espouse. No one (except
an economist) would rebel at the statement that Stanley, who has a
decent job, good mental and physical health, and a loving spouse and
family, is better off than Xavier, who is unemployed, poor, depressed and
alone.
The well-being utility functions that serve as the input to SWFs
contain information about well-being differences and interpersonal
comparisons, as well as tracking preferences: ui (x)  ui (y) iff i has an
appropriately laundered weak preference32 for x over y. ui (x) – ui (y) 
ui (z) – ui (w) iff the difference in i’s well-being between x and y is at least
as large as the difference in i’s well-being between z and w. ui (x)  uj (y)
iff i in x is at least as well off as j in y. To be sure, constructing wellbeing utility functions that reflect all this information is not a trivial matter
(Adler 2016); but the supposition that there are genuine facts about wellbeing differences and interpersonal level comparisons, to be measured by
well-being utility numbers, is not problematic.33
By contrast, it is hard to see what the underlying facts are which are
supposed to be mirrored in moral utility numbers. What would be the
counterpart of well-being differences, or of interpersonal comparisons
of well-being levels – differences in moral satisfaction, or comparisons
of levels of moral satisfaction? Talk of moral satisfaction is no part of
32

33

Recall that welfare-relevant preferences need to be laundered, in the manner stipulated
by whichever version of Preferentism about Well-Being has been adopted. See above,
section 1.
One standard SWF, the leximin SWF, is not sensitive to information about well-being
differences; but this caveat does not undercut the supposition that there is difference
information to be had, as needed, and mirrored in utility numbers.
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ordinary moral discourse. It would be weird to say ‘Ron should give
his cash to Oxfam, not Greenpeace, because helping to prevent hunger
makes a bigger difference to his moral satisfaction than helping to save the
planet’; or to say ‘Phyllis is a big believer in animal rights, while Francine
is a sceptic, and so if government were to regulate treatment of animals
that occurs in factory farms Phyllis would be morally better off – more
satisfied, morally – than Francine’. Whether a putative metaethical fact is
genuine – specifically, here, whether advisors’ moral preferences have a
non-ordinal aspect, in turn determinative of moral goodness – depends,
in some more or less complicated way, on both the truisms constitutive
of our moral concepts (as evidenced by what is said or not said in moral
discourse) and on physical, psychological and social features of the world.
On the first score, at least, the case for such non-ordinal information is
weak.
Turning now to Independence: this axiom, too, seems warranted by
ordinary moral discourse. Here, it should be stressed that our topic has
been moral betterness (comparative moral goodness), rather than moral
rightness or absolute moral goodness. Whether one or another alternative
is right depends upon the totality of alternatives available. And of course
the best alternative in a given situation depends upon the comparative
moral goodness of all the pairs. But it seems to be a truism of ordinary
moral talk that the comparative goodness of two alternatives depends
just upon the characteristics of the two. For example, if government
is choosing between a policy x that increases a population’s happiness
but limits individuals’ choices, and a policy y that increases individual
liberties at the expense of happiness, it would be odd to think that the
truth of the proposition ‘x is better than y’ might depend upon whether
government was also considering a policy z targeted at population health.
Still, a plausible indirect argument can be mounted for rejecting
Independence. Assume that we reject the supposition that non-ordinal
features of advisor preferences help determine moral goodness. We thus
accept ASRC. ASRC, plus the other elements of the quasi-Arrovian setup,
plus the supposition that Universal Domain holds true in a sufficient
number of situations, entails that the moral aggregation function for
every situation with cardinality greater than two must be the Unanimity
Rule. That was the upshot of section 5. And – it might be argued – the
Unanimity Rule is too ready to propagate moral noncomparability from
the heterogeneity of moral preferences that we observe around us and
might imagine to characterize even idealized advisors. Via a process of
reflective equilibrium – used here not in refining our substantive moral
views, but in refining our metaethical understandings – we might end up
rejecting Independence, despite its intuitive appeal, once we see what
it yields when combined with other axioms that we find even more
appealing.
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7. CONCLUSION
This article has identified the problem of metaethical aggregation; offered
a roadmap of different frameworks for analysing the problem; explored
at length one such framework, the ‘quasi-Arrovian setup’; and provided a
characterization of the Unanimity Rule. As a consequence of this moral
aggregation rule, convergence comes in at the ‘back end’, as Output
Convergence (not Ordering Convergence): the weak convergence of
advisors’ moral preferences with respect to two alternatives is a necessary
condition for the moral comparability of the two.
I have focused, throughout, on the problem of moral aggregation as
arising from a particular type of metaethical account, the IA account.
Actually, other accounts may also give rise to that problem. In particular,
expressivism (traditional or hybrid) may do so, since someone may
commit herself to a plan whereby she does whatever is approved
by a community of advisors (Ridge 2006). I don’t think the roadmap
and analyses here would be substantially different if transposed to the
expressivist’s version of the aggregation problem.
The reader familiar with recent work in social choice on ‘aggregation’
may wonder why I have focused throughout on preference aggregation,
saying nothing about judgement aggregation (List 2012). In the judgementaggregation problem, each individual in a community makes logically
coherent judgements about a group of propositions. We want a set
of collective judgements that is logically coherent as well – and bears
appropriate axiomatic connections to the individuals’ judgements, for
example satisfying a unanimity axiom (the analogue here of weak Pareto)
which says that a proposition unanimously believed is in the collective
set.
I believe that metaethical aggregation is, first and foremost, an issue
of preference rather than judgement aggregation.34 If I am wrong about this,
we have yet another topic on which the tools of social choice can usefully
illuminate questions in metaethics.
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The advisors’ judgements about moral goodness are not constitutive of the truth
of propositions regarding moral goodness. Rather, on the IA view, facts about the
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Appendix
The Unanimity Rule for some situation S is the moral aggregation function MS
defined as follows: for all PS ∈ S and all x, y ∈ S, x RM-S y iff x Rk-S y for all
k ∈ N.
Theorem. If #S > 2, and Universal Domain holds true in S, a moral aggregation
function MS satisfies weak Pareto, intermediate Pareto, Independence and Anonymity iff
MS is the Unanimity Rule.
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Proof of the Theorem
In what follows, the S superscript is omitted as S is held fixed. ‘a ↔ b’ is used
to mean ‘a if and only if b’35 and ‘a → b’ is used to mean ‘if a, then b’.
It is straightforward to show that the Unanimity Rule satisfies weak Pareto,
intermediate Pareto, Independence and Anonymity for any  ⊆ UD and for any
#S. (Recall that UDS – for short, UD – is the set of all N-fold concatenations of
quasiorderings of S.) What is established here is that if  = UD and #S > 2, the
four axioms are sufficient to characterize the Unanimity Rule.
A set of advisors G ⊆ N is almost decisive for the ordered pair of alternatives
/ G] →
(x, y) ∈ S × S if for any P ∈ , [x Pk P y for all k ∈ G and y Pi P x for all i ∈
x PM P y. A set of advisors G ⊆ N is decisive if for any P ∈  and for any x, y ∈ S,
[x Pk P y for all k ∈ G] → x PM P y.
Lemma 1. If a group G is almost decisive for some ordered pair (x, y), then it is
decisive.
Proof. Sen’s ‘field expansion’ lemma (Sen 1970: 42–5; Weymark 1984)
establishes this result for the case in which  is the set of all profiles of complete
orderings of S. The same proof applies when, as here,  is the set of all profiles of
quasiorderings of S.

A set of advisors G ⊆ N is a β-oligarchy (Weymark 1984) if (i) G is decisive
and (ii) for any k ∈ G and x, y ∈ S, x Pk P y → not y RM P x.
Lemma 2. There is a unique β-oligarchy and it is N.
Proof. Weymark (1984) generally considers a ‘collective choice rule’ with the
domain all profiles of complete orderings of a set of alternatives, and the codomain
either all binary relations of the set of alternatives, or some subset of such binary
relations. Here, the domain of M is  = UD, all profiles of quasiorderings of S,
and its codomain is all quasiorderings of S. Both Weymark’s Lemma 2 (stating
that at most one oligarchy exists) and Theorem 1 (stating that there exists a βoligarchy) hold true for a collective choice rule with the domain and codomain
of M. The proof of Lemma 2 applies without modification. To modify Weymark’s
proof of Theorem 1: when he assumes y PM P x (using our notation), it is instead
assumed that y RM P x. Moreover, an additional group D is considered consisting
of the individuals in group G who regard x and y as noncomparable. In this new
profile, these individuals rank w below x and y.
By Anonymity, no group other than N can be a β-oligarchy. This establishes
the second part of the result.

Next, it is shown that if some profile P is such that each advisor’s ranking of
x and y is the same as her ranking of y and z, then if x is morally at least as good
as y under P, y must be morally at least as good as z under P.
Two profiles P and P∗ ‘coincide on {x, y}’ if, for all k ∈ N, x Rk P y ↔ x Rk P∗ y
and y Rk P x ↔ y Rk P∗ x.
Lemma 3. For any x, y, z ∈ S, let P ∈  be such that: for all k ∈ N, x Rk P y ↔ y
k
R P z and y Rk P x ↔ z Rk P y. Then x RM P y implies that y RM P z.
Proof.
Let P be as stated in the lemma. Consider two profiles P∗ , P such that (a) P
and P∗ coincide on {x, y} and y Ik P∗ z for all k ∈ N, and (b) P and P coincide on {y,

35

Abbreviated above as ‘a iff b’.
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z} and y Ik P x for all k ∈ N. By Universal Domain, P∗ , P ∈ . Note that (a) and
(b) imply that (c) P∗ and P coincide on {x, z}.
Suppose that x RM P y. By Independence x RM P∗ y. By Pareto indifference
and the transitivity of RM P∗ , it follows that x RM P∗ z. By Independence, x RM P
z. By Pareto indifference and the transitivity of RM P it follows that y RM P z. By

Independence, y RM P z.
Lemma 4. For all x, y ∈ S and all P ∈ , x RM P y implies that x Rk P y for all k ∈
N.
Proof. The result is trivial if x = y. We consider the case x  y.
Because N is a β-oligarchy, x RM P y implies that there does not exist a i ∈ N
for which y Pi P x. Thus for all k ∈ N, either x Rk P y or x NCk P y. Let G = {i ∈ N:
x Ri P y}. Suppose that G  N; we show that this yields a contradiction. Because #S
> 2, there is some z ∈ S distinct from both x and y. Consider a profile P ∈  that
coincides with P on {x, y} such that (a) x Ii P y → y Ii P z and x Pi P y → y Pi P z, for
/ G; and (c) z Pk P x for all k ∈
/ G. By Universal
all i ∈ G; (b) y NCk P z for all k ∈

Domain, P ∈ .
Independence together with the premise x RM P y imply that x RM P y. By
Lemma 3, y RM P z. By the transitivity of RM P , it follows that x RM P z. But x RM P z
/ G contradicts Lemma 2.

and z Pk P x for all k ∈
By Lemma 4 and intermediate Pareto, M is the Unanimity Rule. This
completes the Proof.
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